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Abstract
Given the pervasiveness of corruption, collusion and nepotism during Suharto’s rule
(1967-1998), many people assume that the Reformasi era (1998-present) would introduce a new
wave of liberal democratic values, which would consequently reduce corruption in Indonesia.
This paper seeks to look at the changes in people’s socio-political incentives to corrupt given the
changes in political and legal structure, analyzing it in the context of its contribution to
Indonesia’s socio-economic development. Specifically, it centers on how decentralization has
affected corruption in the regional districts, legislative, judiciary, and other civil society groups.
It is the prominence of the corruption issue in the anti-decentralization arguments - in saying that
transferring autonomy would also transfer along uncontrollable corruption to the local levels that makes this issue worthy to be explored in further details. This paper intends to analyze
critical junctures of Indonesia’s democratization process and evaluates the status of democracy
and corruption in Indonesia today. By drawing on general theories on the relationship between
democratization and corruption, as well as qualitative research conducted by prominent scholars
on Indonesia’s democratization process, this paper concludes that democratization has led to
more available channels through which actors in society can abuse their newfound power, which
has affected Indonesia’s progress in achieving higher socio-economic development.
Keywords: Indonesia, democratization, decentralization, corruption, economic development
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Bawaslu – Badan Pengawas Pemilu, Election Monitoring Committee
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SBY – Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s 6th president
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Preface
As the third largest democracy and the fourth most populous nation, Indonesia has been
the shining model for a civil and peaceful Islam, and a beacon for democracy in Southeast Asia –
a region where authoritarian figures have been on the rise. Its geographical features as a wide
sprawling archipelago with a wide range of ethnicities and customs make it an improbable nation
to have a thriving democracy, but against all odds, Indonesia has proven that democracy is here
to stay.
2014 has been a momentous year for Indonesia as it has made positive strides towards the
consolidation of democracy as shown through successful third direct presidential and legislative
elections. It is also a year where democracy was challenged; as the new parliament brought with
it a contentious political atmosphere with the passing of the bill in the legislative to remove
direct elections for regional leaders, which was countered with a presidential decree by Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) to restore direct elections.
While it is generally presumed that democratization would bring about political
institutions that would provide sufficient checks and balances mechanism, as Indonesia goes
through decentralization, it has not necessarily proved to be successful in reducing corruption
and delivering better public services to the people. The weak implementation of decentralization
in Indonesia lacked the mechanisms to constrain the incentives for old and new political elites to
partake in corrupt, collusive and nepotistic activities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Literature Review
Since 1999, there has been quite a number of publications written on Indonesia’s
democratization and decentralization process, though not necessarily with a focus on its
effect on corruption. Some of the existing literatures focus on how decentralization and
corruption have affected a specific field (i.e. parliament, local leaders), but this paper is
beneficial in providing a thorough overview on the decentralization process in Indonesia, and
offers a more balanced view by considering and synthesizing many viewpoints. It also
provides a qualitative account of how it has impacted corruption in various actors and sectors
and socio-economic development in Indonesia. Nonetheless, despite extensive sources that
were used for this paper, this paper would be stronger and more credible if it had included a
wider variety of quantitative research and first-hand accounts from fieldwork conducted in
Indonesia. As such, this paper does not intend to be the most encompassing report on the
effects of decentralization on corruption in Indonesia, but rather, as a modest starting point to
give readers a broader view on the issue at hand.
Firstly, to supplement the paper with theoretical framework on democratization and
corruption, several sources were used, but the most helpful ones were “Political Corruption
and Democracy” by Susan-Rose Ackerman, “Decentralization Dilemma” by Chanchal
Kumar Sharma, and “Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research” by Krisztina
Kis-Katos and Günther Schulze and “Corruption and Democracy” by Michael Rock.
Furthermore, some of the most helpful sources on democratization in Indonesia come from
prominent scholars on Indonesia’s political development, namely the collection of essays
found in “Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia” edited by Marcus Mietzner and Edward
Aspinall and “Local Power and Politics in Indonesia” edited by Edward Aspinall and Greg
Fealy. Additionally, several recent periodicals such as Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia
Kirana

1

Vol.52 dan 53, and INDONESIA no.96, which included works written by Jeffrey Winters,
Vedi Hadiz, and Richard Robinson, were also extremely helpful in forming the analysis of
this paper. There are relatively few quantitative field research works that specifically look at
democratization and corruption, but findings from “Decentralizaiton and Rent Seeking in
Indonesia” by Akhmad Rizal Shidiq, “Public Sector Reforms and Financial Transparency:
Experiences from Indonesian Districts” by Kristiansen, Dwiyanto, Pramusinto and Putranto
and “Administrative Overspending in Indonesian Districts: Role of Local Politics” by
Bambang Sjahrir, Krisztina Kis-Katos and Günther Schulze” were particularly helpful in
offering first-hand accounts of how decentralization has impacted corruption activities at the
local level.
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Research Methodology
The study utilizes secondary sources by prominent scholars and political scientists on
Indonesia’s economic, historical and political development. The secondary sources on the
general theories on democratization and corruption were made available through JSTOR,
which was accessed through my home institution, Claremont McKenna College. As for the
secondary sources on Indonesia’s democratization were purchased online through the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies’ website, and lastly, the periodicals (i.e. INDONESIA,
Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, and Contemporary Southeast Asia) consulted were made
available from the Graduate Institute’s library in Geneva.
The secondary sources used were also complemented well by anecdotal evidences and
firsthand experiences given from the interviewees whom I had a one-hour long discussion
with. The interviewees’ professional background and experiences also range from professors
(7), think tank researchers (4), UN human rights officer (1), and PhD candidate (1), who are
based either in Geneva, Bern, Brussels, Paris, Freiburg (Germany), and Trier. The
interviewees were found through a meticulous Internet search of scholars who have the
research and experience in the field of Indonesia’s economic and political development, as
well as through references from previous interviewees. The wide range and various
backgrounds of the interviewees would hopefully enhance the depth in perspective and give a
more balanced dimension of the topics being discussed at hand. Some of the interviewees,
such as Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain, Dr. Christian von Lübke, and Ambassador Linggawaty
Hakim, also shared their firsthand experiences in training local leaders, which gave valuable
insight to the paper.
With regards to ethical considerations, the study did not undergo serious ethical
considerations, as the topic does not deal with a sensitive group of the population. When the
Kirana
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study does discuss rather sensitive issues, which are still debatable, the study hopes to give a
more balanced perspective and does not include any unresolved facts. Finally, the study also
respects the privacy issues of the interviewees by informing them of the purpose of the
research project and refraining from taking notes when they said things were off the record.
In terms of limitation, the author was unable to conduct her own field research since
the project undertaken was completed in less than one month while the author was based in
Geneva. Thus, the author was limited to other readily available quantitative and qualitative
research on this field which are accessible online or in libraries in Geneva. Additionally, in
terms of data used to measure corruption, the author was once again limited in terms of data
access because some data prior to the downfall of Suharto is unavailable online. Even for
other data in the period of the post-Suharto era, not all of them are posted online. In terms of
secondary sources, the author was also unable to consult some other useful secondary sources
such as “Demokrasi” by Hamish MacDonald, and “Indonesia: Towards Democracy” by
Taufik Abdullah, “Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance” by H. Ross
McLeod and “Democratizing Indonesia: The Challenges of Civil Society in the Era of
Reformasi” by Mikaela Nyman because they are not accessible online and in bookstores or
libraries in Geneva.
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Introduction and Focus of the Study
Early in 2001, after just one and a half years since the downfall of Suharto1, Indonesia
molded its political system from being one of the most centralized to one of the most
decentralized in the world. The speed and scope at which it happened had astounded all
observers of Indonesian politics, the process has been dubbed as the ‘big bang’ process.2 This
devolution of power was significant as almost overnight, 473 district heads became
responsible for the funding and implementation of socio-economic development including
health, education and public works to an average of 500,000 people.3 Despite its unique
features and its distinctive democratization process, Indonesia has remained invisible in the
global arena and thus few have been written on the subject of Indonesia’s democratization
and decentralization process.
Despite a relatively successful decentralization process, the problem of rampant
corruption in the country remains. While a World Bank study suggests that an ethnically
diverse country does make it harder for states to establish strong, corrupt-free government
institutions 4 , this paper seeks to delve deeper into the extent to which Indonesia’s
decentralization process post-1998 and the change in corruption levels have affected the
ability of public officials to deliver public services and bring about a higher socio-economic
development. It will focus its analysis by looking at how changes in legal laws and political
structures affected the incentives structure of various actors and sectors and whether it has
made them less or more likely to partake in corrupt activities.

1

Sohearto was Indonesia’s second president, who ruled under an authoritarian regime for 32 years
Kai Kaiser, “The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective,” World Bank
2
Kai Kaiser, “The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective,” World Bank
(2002): 2-27.
3
Stein Kristiansen et al, “Public Sector Reforms and Financial Transparency: Experiences from Indonesian
Districts,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 31 No.1 (2008): 66.
4
Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Political Corruption and Democracy," Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series
Paper 592: 363-378. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/592
2
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This paper finds a strong relationship between decentralization and corruption in
Indonesia because of the context under which it operates in. With the Dutch colonization and
authoritarian rule of Suharto in the backdrop, Indonesia has long been burdened with the
problems of corruption, which only exacerbated under the fragmentation of the bribe
collection system during the decentralization process and affected the ability of public
officials to contribute to higher socio-economic development in the country.
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II. ANALYSIS
General theories on democratization, decentralization and corruption:
Quite surprisingly, the impact of democratization on corruption produces mixed
econometrics evidence. Previous studies conducted by various scholars have shown that
while Ades and Di Tella (1998), Goel and Nelson (2005), Chowdhury (2004) and Triesman
argue that the more liberal democratic values a state has, corruption level will fall suit; other
scholars, such as, Fan et al, De Mello and Barenstein (2001), Fisman and Gatti (2002) and
Barenstein have suggested that a decentralized system has a negative effect on corruption.5
At first glance, it is easy to come to the conclusion that democratization should lead to
a reduction in corruption because the checks and balances mechanism in a democracy should
constrain politicians’ greed6 , protect civil liberties and free speech, increase proximity,
transparency and accountability between elected leader and its constituents.7 Democratization
should shift some of the power of the government to the people; and by being accountable to
the people, the level of corruption would decrease. In addition, the ability of the people to
select and remove the politicians of their choosing should encourage corrupt politicians to
weigh in the socio-political cost more of engaging in such actions.8 With the election and reelection mechanism, corrupt activities would bear a higher cost on society as it will alienate
voters, reducing the chance of corrupt politicians to get reelected.9
In practice, the relationship between democratization and corruption might not be as
straightforward. Michael Rock pointed out that theory and case show that democratization
5

Krisztina Kis-Katos and Günther Schulze, “Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research,” ANU:
Asian Pacific Economic Literature (2013): 81-83.
6
Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Political Corruption and Democracy," Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series
Paper 592: 363-378. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/592
7
Chanchal Sharma, “Decentralization Dilemma: Measuring the degree and evaluating the outcomes,” The
Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 67 No.1 (2006): 56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856192 .
8
Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus and Michael Lusztig, “Corruption, Democracy and Economic Growth,”
International Political Science Review Vol.27 No.2 (2006): 124. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445044.
9
Ibid.
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does breed corruption, at least up to a point.10 This is due to the idea that young democracies
suffer from insufficient checks and balances mechanism, and the lack of transparency and
accountability in the early stages make it easier for rent seekers to exploit the system and
have greater access to public officials without opening them up to public scrutiny. He also
found that the turning point in the relationship between corruption and durability of
democracy occurs between 4-15 years. 11 Moreover, within an electoral democracy, the
competitiveness created amongst political candidates is presumed to reduce corruption,
however, the increased competitiveness could also bring along money politics involved in
campaigning, which would further increase the likelihood of corruption. When a young
democracy lacks the appropriate checks and balances mechanism, it opens itself up for
greater state capture by local elites.12
Decentralization is defined as, “The transfer of responsibility for planning,
management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies
to field units of central government ministries or agencies, subordinate units or levels of
government, semi autonomous public authorities or corporations, and area-wide, regional or
functional authorities. 13” The decentralization of power is often times one of the most
important elements of democratization. As power is delegated from the central government to
regional governments, it produces the opportunity for a state to create a more equal balance
of power and ensures that no one branch is powerful enough to shape the politics of the
country.14 Decentralization also aims to create more accountability and ensure higher public
service delivery, as the elected representative would be closer to the people. Nonetheless,
10

Michael Rock, “Corruption and Democracy,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Working Papers No. 55 (2007): 3-4. http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp55_2007.pdf
11
Ibid.
12
Chanchal Sharma, “Decentralization Dilemma: Measuring the degree and evaluating the outcomes,” The
Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 67 No.1 (2006): 56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856192 .
13
Arellano Colongon, Jr. “What Is Happening on the Ground? The Progress of Decentralisation,” in Local
Power and Politics in Indonesia, ed. By Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 88.
14
Akhmad Rizal Shidiq, “Decentralization and Rent-Seeking in Indonesia,” Ekonomi dan Keuangan Vol.51
No.2 (2003): 181.
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decentralization does not always reap positive benefits, as the delegation to a very small
region would make macroeconomic management a complicated task to do, lead to bigger
interregional disparities and would not be successful in maintaining accountability if the
mechanism is not there yet. Khan (2002) argues that in order for decentralization to improve
governance and accountability at the local level, it has to have an effective general election,
the ability of the local politicians to control bureaucrats, and the availability of public
indicators to assess government performance.15 Sadly, these three features are often found
missing in developing countries.
Context: chronological account on the downfall of Suharto
While each country’s political development is unique to their own, and that a
generalized theory often does not apply to all countries in the same way, such example is
found in the case of Indonesia following the downfall of Suharto. The downfall of Suharto in
May 1998 marked a watershed in Indonesia’s history; and a clear understanding of the event
is necessary in order to fully appreciate Indonesia’s democratic transition.16 For 32 years,
Suharto’s grip on power as the second president of Indonesia was unyielding and ruthless.
Calling his regime the ‘New Order,’ Suharto ruled over a military dictatorship, where the
army interceded in almost all aspects of life.17 Although he was often criticized for his many
human rights abuses, he was also praised for his ability to remarkably improve Indonesia’s
economy, education, health and overall living conditions. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
and the consequences that followed greatly undermined Suharto’s power, and ultimately
played a momentous role in Suharto’s downfall. However, there were also other pre-existing
problems that weakened his power, namely, the weaknesses of the New Order government,
15

Ibid.
Douglas Ramage, “INDONESIA: Democracy First, Good Governance Later,” Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies (2007): 135. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27913330 .
17
Pete Brown, Indonesia: downfall of a dictator, Communist Voice, 1 August 1998, available from
http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/18cSuharto.html; Internet; accessed 5 January 2011.
16
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nepotism and corruption in the country, Suharto’s eroding legitimacy, gradual loss of support
from the Army and his ministers and the general discontentment in the country. Simply put,
the Asian Financial Crisis sped up the process of his downfall and when the subsidies on
consumer goods were lifted, the pressure was too much for Suharto’s already frail
government to handle.
Unsurprisingly, in an atmosphere where the centralized political structure of the
previous regime was challenged, decentralization seemed inevitable and stood like the only
choice in a population whose fed up with the concentration of power among Suharto’s inner
circles and in Jakarta. With the sudden removal of Suharto from power, the cycle of Suhartocentric cronyism and nepotism dissolved as they had lost the figure that had glued them all
together.
Indonesia’s decentralization process
The overarching feature of Indonesia’s democratization process was the unique speed
and scope at which it happened. Dr. Christian von Lübke reflected this sentiment, saying that
it was surprising that the central government relegated its duties in such a short time to such a
low level.18 The political and administrative devolution of power that took place were at a
level previously unheard of, immediately transferring political, fiscal and administrative
power to 500 sub-national governments at the district level in only 1.5 years.19 In accordance
to decentralization theories, it was introduced with the aim of fostering democracy and
introducing legitimacy in a political system that had just overcome decades of authoritarian
rule. The idea of a federalist system was discarded immediately due to fears of disintegration

18

Christian von Lübke (researcher at the Arnold Bergstrasser Institut in Freiburg, Germany) in discussion with
the author, November 4, 2014
19
Ibid.
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and the repulsion towards the Dutch colonization history. 20Marcus Mietzner, a leading
scholar on Indonesia’s democratization, dubbed decentralization as a “political response
towards Balkanization in Indonesia.21”
The main driving force behind Indonesia’s decentralization was political, namely, fear
of disintegration in an atmosphere seasoned with secessionist movements in Aceh and
Papua.22 Secondly, the other main reason for decentralization was the need to improve
people’s welfare, as it was hoped that by giving more power to the districts, regional leaders
would be able to deliver more appropriate public services to the people.23 The first reason
accounts for why devolution of power was given to districts instead of provinces, as the
central government was worried that giving more power to a bigger and more powerful
province would further fuel separatist tensions in the country. The central government thus
believed that transferring some powers would appease them and forestall future secessionist
aspirations.24 However, by doing so, it makes it harder for districts – with more limited
resources and capable personnel than provinces – to be able to deliver higher socio-economic
development.
Admittedly, the decision to decentralize was not an easy one to make. Having been
colonized by the Dutch for 343 years has created a strong nationalism out of the anti-colonial
struggle for independence.25 It is the same nationalism that sustained the centralization of the
nation-state during Sukarno and Suharto’s era, which made the introduction of
20

Gabriele Ferazzi, “Using the ‘F’ Word: Federalism in Indonesia’s Decentralization Discourse,” Publius
Vol.30 No.2 (2000): 66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331088
21
Felix Heiduk (researcher at the SWP in Berlin, Germany) in discussion with the author, October 23, 2014
22
Michael Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: the Marginalisation of the Public
Sphere,” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, ed. by Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall.
(Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 268-269
23
Linggawaty Hakim (Indonesian ambassador to Switzerland in Bern, Switzerland) in discussion with the
author, November 5, 2014
24
Michael Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: the Marginalisation of the Public
Sphere,” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, ed. by Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall.
(Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 268-269
25
Paul Carnegie, “Democratization and Decentralization in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Understanding Transition
Dynamics,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 81 No. 4 (2008-2009): 518. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40377625
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decentralization measures even more of a significant feat in Indonesian politics.26 Looking of
it from a geopolitical lens, it also made perfect sense for Indonesia to decentralize as the
archipelago is amazingly diverse in terms of geography and ethno-demography.27 Giving the
regions autonomy would allow each region to fully express themselves culturally, socially
and politically, all the while maintaining national unity.28
The two most crucial decentralization laws that were introduced were Law
No.25/1999 on revenue sharing and Law No.22/1999 on regional government, both of which
were introduced in 2001. These two laws transferred a great degree of political authority to
the district and municipality level of government, leaving the central government with the
responsibilities of deciding on matters such as security and defense, foreign policy, justice
and religious affairs. 29 At the time when these two laws were introduced, there were
surprisingly few debates and amendments, which signaled a positive willingness to create
genuine reform towards democracy and better governance.30 Ryaas Rasyid, the head of the
committee involved with formulating decentralization policies and legislations, recalled that,
"Members of parliament generally considered the bills to be too good to be true; for the first
time, the government itself had initiated a policy to reduce its own powers and surrender
authority to the regions in a significant way.31"
Law No.25/1999 on revenue sharing outlines a new system of fiscal arrangements
between Indonesia’s national and subnational political entities. The new law guarantees at
26

Paul Carnegie, “Democratization and Decentralization in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Understanding Transition
Dynamics,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 81 No. 4 (2008-2009): 518. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40377625 .
27
Kai Kaiser, “The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective,” World Bank
(2002): 2-27.
28
Ryaas Rasyid, “Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia,” in Local Power and Politics in
Indonesia, ed. By Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 71.
29
Michael Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: the Marginalisation of the Public
Sphere,” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, ed. by Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall.
(Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 267.
30
Ryaas Rasyid, “Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia,” in Local Power and Politics in
Indonesia, ed. By Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 63.
31
Ryaas Rasyid, “Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia,” in Local Power and Politics in
Indonesia, ed. By Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 63.
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least 26% of net domestic revenue to local governments, of which 90% had to be allocated to
districts and municipalities.32 Since local transfers had never reached 25% in the years prior
to 1999, the fiscal decentralization policy significantly increases the revenues of local
governments.33 In addition to earning revenues from local taxes and user charges,34 local
governments also earn intergovernmental fund transfer from the central government in the
form of DAU (General Allocation Fund), DAK (Specific Allocation Fund), and revenue
sharing for taxes and natural resources. 35 One unique aspect of Indonesia’s fiscal
decentralization process is that it only affects the expenditure side of the district budgets, as
revenues remain largely centralized. 36 An implication of the law is the high share of
intergovernmental transfers make for a high budget dependence of the local government to
the central government, and makes local government vulnerable to political intervention.37
Law No.22/1999 on regional government spelled out the conditions for the devolution
of political authority, initially stipulating that district heads, mayors and governors were to be
elected by local parliaments.38 However, when it was found out that local parliaments were
using their power for rent-seeking purposes, the central government issued Law No.32/2004
on regional government, which introduced direct, popular elections for district heads, mayors
and governors. The introduction of direct election for regional heads in 2004 truly marked
Indonesia’s leap towards consolidating their democracy, by giving the people, as well as the

32

Michael Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: the Marginalisation of the Public
Sphere,” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, ed. by Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall.
(Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 268.
33
Akhmad Rizal Shidiq, “Decentralization and Rent-Seeking in Indonesia,” Ekonomi dan Keuangan Vol.51
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subnational governments, as district heads who are now allowed to introduce their own
regulations and appoint their own civil servants in local parliament secretariat, more power. 39
The new law was introduced with the hopes of reducing the influence of political parties,
increasing accountability and strengthening checks and balances mechanism as it put into
effect term limits for regents, mayors, governors, presidents and vice presidents to two 5-year
terms.40
The progress that direct elections have shown in helping the consolidation of
Indonesia’s democracy is remarkable. Between 2004 and 2009, on average, over 100
subnational elections were run annually, with the average Indonesian voting in seven or eight
separate ballots in those five years.41 Moreover, the replacement of Law No.3/1999 on
general elections, which called for a closed list party system, by the new Law No.12/2003 on
general elections, which introduces an open list party system helped to boost transparency
and accountability at the local level.42 To further increase competitiveness among candidates,
in December 2008, the Constitutional Court abolished party list rankings and in the 2009
elections, allowed for individual candidates to be put on the ballot regardless of their party
ranks.43
However, these new laws come with several dire consequences. Not only is the bar
set very high for candidates to appear on the ballots without party support, those who thought
they stood a chance of winning a seat in a local parliament often find themselves in massive
debt, so much so that some of them had committed suicide or suffered a mental breakdown.44
Additionally, the execution of some of the past direct elections was also tainted with
39
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incidences of vote rigging and other irregularities.45 Unfortunately, the introduction of direct
elections is not enough to change the corruption patterns. One reason for the increase in
corruption scandals in subnational politics is the weak legal and social sanctions against their
behaviors, legal loopholes and the weak upholding of the rule of law by the judiciary. In 2006,
more than 1,000 local parliamentarians were implicated in corruption-related charges, and in
2008, more than 20 governors, former governors, district heads and mayors were detained or
suspected to be involved in corruption cases.46 The reason behind these rampant corruption
charges could perhaps be explained by the link between introduction of direct local elections
and the funding of campaigns by local businesses,47 which is also a problem found in mature
democracies such as the US because the high cost of congressional races must be raised from
private sources.48
The challenge then for democratic systems is to find the delicate balance between
financing political campaigns without encouraging candidates to depend heavily on private
sources to support them.49 Another reason is that the rapid fiscal decentralization to 473
regional leaders has made them vulnerable to acts of corruption, collusion and nepotism.50
The incidences of corruption have become so common that the term ‘money politics’ has
been attached to almost all elections for governors and mayors.51 This goes to show that some
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electoral systems are more vulnerable to special interest influences and other means of public
oversight are needed for direct elections to be a successful aspect of democracy.52
To respond to this problem, the central government established the Legislative
Election Law in 2007, which called for the creation of an election oversight agency, Bawaslu
(Election Monitoring Agency), tasked to monitor campaigns and election rules violations.53
Additionally, changes in the judiciary – the shifting of authority to arbitrate disputes in
subnational executive elections from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court – has
also helped to build the legitimacy of the elections.54 The responsiveness of the central
government to these issues and the high level of public involvement in exposing bribery and
other corruption acts have helped to increase the credibility of subnational elections. 55
Furthermore, the public support for direct elections is overwhelming, which was aptly
reflected through the direct demands against the recent UUD Pilkada 56 referendum in
September 2014. 57 The general population argued that their participation in the direct
elections is a strong political empowerment tool; and taking them away would greatly impair
transparency and accountability between them and their regional leaders.58 It has been an
interesting turnaround of events as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed a presidential decree
at the last minute to return the status quo of direct elections. However, it still has to go
through the DPR, the only chamber with the power to pass laws that defines a legislature.59
Currently, the committee session in the DPR in charge of processing this issue has not
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resumed yet. Therefore, at the point that this paper is written, this issue has not yet been
resolved.60
When looking at the initial stages of decentralization in Indonesia, one cannot
overlook the contribution of Habibie, Indonesia’s 3rd president. As a man from Sulawesi, he
disliked the Java-centric development and state apparatus, and expedited the decentralization
process. In addition, the need to set himself apart from his predecessor and as a reformer also
hastened the speed of the special session of the MPR on decentralization.61 Paul Carnegie
dubbed Habibie’s period as a ‘Gorbachevesque period of political reform,62’ and indeed it
was. Habibie’s pragmatism and fear of grassroots insurgencies made for a smoother
democratic transition.63 Habibie, who was a technocrat himself, asked Ryaas Rasyid, another
technocrat, to create a group called “Tim Tujuh” (Team Seven) to formulate policy and
legislation64 and ensure the establishment of a clear line separating decentralization and
federalism.
Nonetheless, the hasty speed at which decentralization took place was done at the
expense of effectiveness and efficiency.65 In May 1999, the parliament rushed through the
regional government and center-region financial relations bills to promise broad autonomy to
the regions, noting that this would only apply to districts while provinces should remain
limited in their power.66 From the initial implementation stage, the bill already proved to
contain many inconsistencies, which led to poor implementation and confusion among those
trying to implement it. Remnants of the centralistic system of the Suharto regime also had not
60
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shed off completely, making it even harder to form new institutional formation and
bureaucratic behavior across the archipelago.67
To make matters worse, Indonesia had undergone a Pemekaran Process, a bottom up
process of decentralization, in which the number of districts swiftly blossomed to close to
500 districts; which accounted for a 60% increase in regional autonomy.68 The competitions
amongst regions made the task of the central government harder, especially in light of the
fact that some of these districts do not necessarily have the capacity to be independent and
self-sufficient. Instead of creating more accountability to the people, many of the new
districts ended up being overpowered by special interests that were only interested in power
and the new autonomy their district would receive.69
Status of Indonesia’s Democracy
The process of consolidating a political system does not happen overnight, and while
Indonesia has had successes in its 16 years of democratization, it also still has a long way to
go to fully consolidate its democracy. By almost all measures, Indonesia would now be
considered as an open democratic system with free and fair elections, decentralization of
power away from Jakarta, high voter turnout rates, free press, and the formation of advocacy
groups and civil society organizations.70 Indonesia has mostly checked off the factors that
make up an electoral democracy, however, issues of corruption and weak law enforcement
have made it harder for Indonesia to be considered a liberal democracy.71 Admittedly,
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compared to its East Asian counterparts, Indonesia’s rule of law and quality of governance
remain lower, though support for democracy and liberal democratic values compare
favorably.72 The challenge and threshold for Indonesia now in being classified as a liberal
democracy is when it can prove to be formidable against threats of reversal and ensure that
democracy becomes ‘the only game in town.73’
Even with the strong support for democracy in Indonesia, scholars have started to
question the authenticity of Indonesia’s democratization due to the strong influence of the old
political elites.74 Education barriers, financial charges and logistical thresholds have been set
in place to bar new candidates to enter the realm of politics. Liberals with the likes of Jeffrey
Winters, Vedi Hadiz and Robinson have maintained the view that strong oligarchs remain a
powerful force in Indonesia’s democracy largely support this view, and local politics have
become dominated by predatory elites.75 Vedi Hadiz argued that democracy in Indonesia has
been “all about elites and wealth and the preservation of power of the powerful
conglomerates…[and that] democracy hasn’t really changed anything.76”
Notwithstanding the role that money plays and the political power that these oligarchs
hold, scholars like Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner contend that the power of these old
political elites have decreased because they have had to subordinate themselves to new
elements and principles in Indonesian politics.77 They have then adapted themselves to fit the
new rules of the game, thereby reducing a significant amount of their previously unrestrained
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influence.78 It is hoped that overtime as democratic institutions start to set its roots in
Indonesian politics, it would also modify and mold the behaviors of these old political elites
to more representative and competitive politics.79 Milestones such as the passing of major
constitutional amendments in 2002 without the intervention of major intra-elite conflict have
also helped to build the legitimacy and authenticity of Indonesia’s democratization. 80
Therefore, given that decentralization goes well, it would stand as an important cornerstone
of Indonesia’s democratization process.81
Status of Corruption in Indonesia
Despite several positive progresses, Indonesia’s decentralization process has also
suffered from challenges of rampant corruption spreading at the local and regional level.
Corruption is traditionally defined as breaking of the rules by public officials for private gain
that distorts resource allocation and the effectiveness of the economy.82 Corruption activities
include bribing in exchange for favorable treatment, favoring family members and relatives
and giving them preferential treatment (nepotism), and illegal coordination in order to gain an
unfair advantage (collusion). 83 Some of the negative effects of corruption include: less
resource allocation for productive activities, economic and political uncertainties, and
increased cost of business.84 While corruption could theoretically exist alongside electoral
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politics, corrupt democratic governments hold the power to reform themselves85 and are
associated with lower confidence in public institutions.86
During the New Order regime, the main actors of rent seeking mostly consisted of
Suharto’s families, cronies, bureaucrats and the military. The degree of nepotism that
entrenched Indonesia’s social, economy and political sphere has become a public secret, and
became one of the fuel for the student demonstrations in May 1998 that brought Suharto’s
32-year iron fist rule to an end. These corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) acts could
be found in the way Suharto used Golkar as party vehicle to exploit powerful local
aristocrats, and government projects as the main object of kickbacks, payments, and
favoritism in the business and investment sector.87 Nonetheless, despite the centralized and
conspicuous traces of corruption in the country, the New Order era was successful in
minimizing rents based on transfer because of central planning and coordination, as well as
its ability to minimize political conflicts. 88 Even with the high costs associated with
corruption and bureaucratic red tape, these costs were predictable and calculated as part of
transaction costs. 89 The monopoly of big businesses by Suharto’s family members and
cronies were also easier to manage than the harassment that may come from many local level
bureaucrats.90 This political stability then translated to the high economic growth rates and
capitalist developments both at the central and local levels.91 With its strong system of
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patronage, the issue of corruption became less detrimental economically in Suharto-era
Indonesia than in a politically decentralized system.92
In contrast, decentralization has not brought upon favorable results in terms of
nominal economic growth or socio-economic development. 93 Despite advocates and
opponents of decentralizing agreeing that it would lead to better governance and local
accountability, they have failed to take into account that decentralization would bring forth
more rent seeking opportunities and higher corruption incidences. 94 Granted, right after
Suharto’s regime was toppled, there were various calls and committees created to conduct
investigations on the wealth that Suharto’s families and cronies had amassed while they were
in power,95 signaling a positive trend towards the reduction of corruption and nepotism.
However, given the weak law enforcement, most of the wealth were never investigated and
most of the anger were only directed towards a few people, the most popular being Suharto’s
son, Tommy Suharto.96
In terms of other corrupt activities, they may have even exacerbated in the Reformasi
period. With more empowered local leaders and more bureaucratic institutions, there are
more loopholes in which special interests could fit themselves in and capture pieces of wealth
here and there.97 Local elite capture could take place because horizontal accountability still
tends to be very weak, despite theories showing that new budgeting system in the Reformasi
era should have introduced a more accountable and transparent budget policy in local
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government.98 The disarray has also been caused by the blurring of accountability, which can
be seen in the way local parliament members are unable to access district budget details and
central government’s losing control over local governments’ financial arrangements.99 These
alarming corruption patterns lead to an even more alarming conclusion: decentralization of
political power also led to new structure of predatory networks of patronage and the
decentralization of corruption. McLeod (2005) argued that democratization saw the fall of the
franchise system, the rise of money politics and the re-emergence of franchise actors as
participants in Indonesia’s newly democratic polity, compromising its democratic
consolidation.100
Within a comparative and theoretical framework, there are mixed empirical evidences
that show that fiscal, political and administrative decentralization could reduce corruption
and improve public service delivery (in countries such as Bolivia, Switzerland, Bangladesh
and Albania), and there are those that conclude otherwise (in countries such as China and
India).101 One thing that most scholars agree on is that decentralization was a positive force
and development towards more stability and fewer separatism movements and regional
violence in Indonesia. 102 However, critics have also noted two main criticisms of
decentralization, namely, the decline in the quality of governance due to incapacity of local
administrators and increasing regional inequality, and the undermining of national cohesion
due to constant miscommunication and lack of coordination between the central and regional
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government.103 Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall succinctly summarized the outcome of
the decentralization process, noting that, “Overall, decentralization has massively
transformed the face of Indonesia and its politics, but it has proven to be neither the nemesis
feared by its critics nor the savior anticipated by its advocates.104”
How democratization, decentralization and corruption have affected the ability of
different sectors and actors to deliver public goods to the people
The crux of the analysis lies in how decentralization policies have changed the
incentives for actors in various sectors to partake in corrupt activities, which would in turn
determine their ability to contribute to and improve the country’s socio-economic
development. It is important to investigate the incentives faced by various actors as human
actors are affected by and affect political culture and institutions.105 Additionally, since
decentralization policies have affected almost all facets of society, it is crucial to carefully
analyze the labyrinth of decision-making processes that these different actors undergo.106 The
analysis that follows will focus on how the changes in legal framework and political
structures lead to the ability or the disability of different actors to deliver public goods and
achieve higher socio-economic development.
Local leaders
Since the main premise of decentralization was to give more power and autonomy to
the districts, the main analysis would focus on how it has impacted various district heads. It is
the sector where everyone had hoped decentralization policies would help most: by having
103
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leaders who are closer to the people, transparency and accountability would increase and they
would be able to improve socio-economic development of their own respective districts.
Since political and administrative authorities were dissolved to 473 districts with
different levels of political culture and institutions, consequently, decentralization policies
affected them in various ways, and coming up with a universal conclusion then becomes a
complicated task. Additionally, at the time the policies were implemented, the different
regions were also at varying states of preparedness, and the vagueness of the law has made
them up for interpretation by each respective district. 107 As a result, coming up with
generalizations is almost impossible, as some districts have remained in tight oligarchic
control while others have completely embraced reformist leaders and ideas.108 In this regard,
scholars are only able to offer anecdotal evidences based on individual cases.109
Some noticeable strengths of decentralization are evidence suggesting that the
increasing probability of external audits by the central government significantly reduced
missing funds in the project,110 local governments becoming more responsive to lower levels
of local public infrastructure,111 and the ability of the people to watch more closely and throw
out corrupt or underperforming local officials.112 There are also now more channels for social
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control and more democratic decision-making processes, which would hopefully help to
reduce corruption at the local level.113
However, people have grown more frustrated over the years as they still find it hard to
influence and shape local politics as expected.114 The lack of guidelines from the central
government has exacerbated uncertainty and tensions in the regions as each district started to
interpret the law whimsically.115 Contrary to the general expectations, there is also a lack of
transparency and checks and balances mechanism in all districts. 116 Consequently, the
conditions make it very vulnerable for political capture, which then furthers the interests of
specialized elite groups, threatening the speed and promise of economic and political
development.117 A general consensus that seems to be agreed upon by various scholars who
have done field research in Indonesia is the lack of relevant experience of the officials in
charge. As regional autonomy grows, so do the incentives for local politicians to collude, as
they now possess a type of autonomy and power previously unbeknownst to them. 118
Incidentally, as the district heads become more powerful, they are also more prone to local
elite capture; as they are now able to provide these elites with the privileges that they need to
continue their monopolistic and nepotistic ways.119 Furthermore, some clans have also seized
the opportunity to turn their district into personal fiefdoms and have secured strategic
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government positions for family members and their inner circle, reversing the stronghold of
the grassroots democratic movement that helped bring Suharto down from power.120
To be fair, the blame for the lack of accountability at the local level cannot be fully
put on the central government, as the newly minted regional heads are also trying hard to
maintain their regional autonomy in the face of higher levels of the hierarchical executive
system.121 Given this mindset, any attempts by the central government to strengthen vertical
accountability and coordinate policies were immediately rejected among leading district
bureaucrats.122 On the other hand, some districts also recalled the reluctance of the central
government to fully pass on their authorities as required by the law, seen through the
slowness of the supporting regulations for Law 22 and 25/1999, inconsistencies in law
implementation and reactive manner in ratifying regulations.123 The tension between the
central and local governments has made it harder for them to work together to reach higher
levels of socio-economic development.
Specifically, a main problem of miscommunication and lack of coordination started to
become most visible in the environmental protection realm. Firstly, districts were now
responsible for issuing its own small and medium scale logging concessions, which has led to
collusion amongst local politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen over control of forest
areas.124 The collusion at the local level has complicated the work of the central government
to keep a strong national mandate for reducing deforestation and solving the haze problem.125
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In addition, this implies that decentralization has also led to more deforestation on a large
scale as districts are getting 80% of the revenues. The huge financial incentives have often
times outweigh the need to stay in line with the central government’s commitment to reduce
deforestation.126
With regards to the fiscal decentralization, all of a sudden district heads are
responsible for 40% of the primary and secondary education, health services, environmental
protection and infrastructure aspect of their budget.127 A study conducted by Krisztina KisKatos and Günther Schulze at the University of Freiburg finds that districts spend an
overwhelming 33.3% of their entire budget on general administrative spending and not on
public services.128 To paint a comparison, developed countries such as the US and Norway
only spend 3% and 8%, respectively, on administrative expenses. The high administrative
spending sheds a light on the lack of incentives on behalf of the district heads to improve
public service delivery.129 The results also indicate that accountability mechanisms are still
weak at the local level and democratization policies have not yet contributed to reduction in
wasteful government spending. 130 Their finding is in line with the idea that corrupt
democratic government will not contribute to higher socio-economic development, as they
will continuously spend the money on themselves and not on the people. 131 The high
incidences of money politics at the local level have also led them to come to the conclusion
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that corruption has not declined significantly under democratization, but rather has become
more decentralized and harder to detect.132
The result of the study is echoed by Michael Buehler, a leading expert on Indonesia’s
democratization, who noted that, “despite decentralization initiatives, public service delivery
has not improved at the local level since 1999.133” Other reasons that account for the lack of
socio-economic development (that may not necessarily be caused by corruption) are the lack
of leadership, technical know-how and information on how to improve public service
delivery at the local level, both in terms of fiscal and political decentralization.134 Another
reason is the difficulty that local leaders face in forming coherent and effective projects,
thereby failing to use the annual budget effectively for development areas.135 For example, by
July 2008, the province of Jakarta had spent only 17% of its annual budget.136 When new
regulations were introduced, they were often of low quality and have obstructed economic
activity, such as the introduction of predatory taxes that hamper investment.137
On the bright side of things, the empowerment of local leaders has given birth to the
rise of centennials with the likes of Joko Widodo, who started out as a mayor in Solo, then
governor of Jakarta and now the 7th president of Indonesia. Commonly referred to as Jokowi,
he was a man born out of the process of decentralization; and his rise signaled the demand
and need for more reformists in the government and set the tone for change in Indonesia’s
political culture. Other reformist leaders such as Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (vice governor of
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Jakarta) and Tri Rismaharini (mayor of Surabaya) were also helped by these decentralization
policies as it allowed them to reach high levels of popularity based on perceptions of
improved service, even in areas where it appeared to have been very modest.138
Parliament
The parliament is also another key sector in Indonesia’s democratization process as it
has historically been the site of competition between the residual forces of the New Order
elites and new contenders.139 After the downfall of Suharto, the amended constitution now
gives three chambers a role in the legislative process. While largely a rubber stamp institution
under the executive-heavy leadership style of Suharto, the parliament started to play an
important role with the introduction of free and fair elections, end of restrictions on civic
freedoms and reforms carried out in 1999-2002 that shifted power away from the executive to
the legislative.140 Specifically, the legislative now has the power to receive all reports of the
State Audit Agency and appoint their members, select members of the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission, select Indonesian ambassadors and veto
those proposed by foreign countries and approve the appointment of the armed forces, chief
of police and members of the KPK and other officials.141 The shifting of power to the
legislative in the early stages of the Reformasi era was a necessary response towards the
centralization of power in the executive during both Sukarno142 and Suharto’s rule, and it was
hoped that the legislative would act as a strong checks and balances mechanism for the
executive during the Reformasi period.
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However, today, it is contended that the balance of power has swung too heavily on
the legislative side, which is offsetting the initial need for the checks and balances
mechanisms.143 Tilting the scale in favor of one branch of the government would further
encourage corruption. Yuki Fukuoka writes, “Democratization, or the growing importance of
the parliament, as well as political elites in accessing and controlling state resources, enabled
them to regain access to patronage.144” Furthermore, the closed-door meetings have made it
harder for the public to monitor individual performance of DPR legislators and their parties.
In addition, the compartmentalization of the structure of the DPR in committees has also
contributed to the collusive nature of the institution.145 Finally, in an article, “Public Sector
Reforms and Financial Transparency: Experiences from Indonesian Districts,” published by
the Contemporary Southeast Asia Journal, it notes that, “local members of parliament are
normally elected based on their willingness to pay their electorates and are therefore easily
silenced by financial sharing arrangements with the district head and his team of leading
bureaucrats.146” All of these factors make it hard for the DPR to build their legitimacy of the
legislative as a KKN-free institution.
Nevertheless, there has been several positive developments in the parliament, such as
the growing role of the opposition parties that act as checks and balances system in the
legislative,147 decline of favor extortion from ministries, state-owned enterprises and private
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companies148 and the increased public hearings and people’s forum. All of these activities
combined have contributed greatly to the routinization of democracy in Indonesia.149 In an
interview with Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain, who has written extensively on the role of the
parliament in Indonesia’s democratization, he commented that even with the DPR’s flaws
and incompetency, it is important for Indonesia to have a strong counterpart to the
executive’s power. He also noted that the checks and balances system in the government is
currently working, as shown through the dominance of Koalisi Merah Putih (KMP), led by
Prabowo, who has the majority in both the MPR and DPR, which is giving the executive, led
by Jokowi, a hard time.150
Judiciary
Perhaps the judiciary has one of the worst reputations in the Indonesian government
as its reputation has been smeared with low judicial standards, lax enforcement151 and a
dysfunctional criminal justice system.152 In a democratic state, the judiciary plays a critical
role in upholding a strong rule of law and a strict law enforcement mechanism to reduce the
incentives for politicians and other public officials to get involved in corrupt acts. When
political elites do not face the rightful consequences and could simply wield off any charges
with money, it sends a negative message that the rule of law could simply be undermined
when one has a big enough political influence and financial resources. These kinds of
behavior add to the atmosphere of corruption, and encourage big scale corruption as well as
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petty corruption from the lowest level of the government and civil service.153 The root cause
of the legal disarray perhaps lies in the constant game of extortion and forced-sharing that
redistributes wealth among Indonesia’s oligarchs and elites,154 low quality of legal training,155
and the unpreparedness of the country’s legal structure which has been debilitated and
defunct in the era of Suharto. Given the influence of the oligarchs in the judiciary, Jeffrey
Winters noted that “democracy without law” is the scenario that Indonesia has been playing
in since 1998.156 The need to reform the judiciary system holds great implication as it not
only is a virtue by itself, but by strengthening the rule of law in the country, it would reduce
the stronghold of the oligarchs and empower lower class groups157, and reduce the incentives
for politicians to maneuver their influence for their own use and channel their influence to
work towards improving the standard of living of the people.
Businesses
Apart from the government, big businesses also play a strong role in giving the
incentives for public servants to partake in corrupt, collusive and nepotistic activities. One
way in which the intersection of business and politics contributed to the increase in
corruption is the way that new local regulations on taxes, levies and other permits are
designed to create artificial regulations. 158 Local bureaucrats have also taken it upon
themselves to use their newly founded power to extract rents from corporations, further
promoting rent-seeking behavior in the district-level. 159 Unsurprisingly, rent-seeking
153
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activities in the business sector are mostly focused on bribery and other local government
regulations, such as, business license, fire safety inspection, environmental compliance,
taxes, and other permits.160 While doing business was not free of corruption either during the
Sohearto era, at the very least it was centralized and controllable in a sense. With
decentralization, it has also dispersed the local actors involved in bribery and rent taking.
Perhaps, this sheds some light as to why even with pervasive corruption during the New
Order, it did not exert too negative of an influence on economic growth in that area.161
More alarmingly today, however, is the growing involvement of big businesses and
oligarchs in the realm of politics. Jeffrey Winters goes even further to say that, “For the first
time in Indonesia’s modern history, its politics are more dominated by oligarchs than by
fractious elites.162” The opportunities for corruption also became ripe after the fall of Suharto
as the oligarchs responds to the idea that popular participation is welcomed in a democracy,
and began to participate in public office, transforming Indonesia’s political system into an
electoral ruling oligarchy.163 The irony became apparent in the availability of ways that
oligarchs can now exercise their power in a democracy, further entrenching themselves in the
politics, perhaps to an extent even further than they were in during the Suharto regime.164
Granted, the power of oligarchs is still constrained in a democracy, and though they
are not the most powerful, they are formidable, and their influence over the country’s politics
is deep and distorting.165 For example, oligarchs have the ability to dictate the course of
politics by shaping who can run and get appointed to top party and government posts; and
while the people are the ones who eventually decide the candidates, the selection of choices
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are only amongst politicians who are backed by these oligarchs. 166 The ramification of this is
quite troubling for Indonesia’s democracy, as an oligarch-controlled democracy has no strong
incentives to improve its judicial independence and impose legal constraints on itself.167
Unsurprisingly, the progressive liberals find themselves in disappointment as they are unable
to exert as much power in post-Suharto Indonesia due to the lack of coordination and
financial resources, especially with the rise of extra-legal forms of social and political
corruption, violence and coercion. 168 With the stronghold that these oligarchs have on
Indonesia’s politics, it seems, then, that “the wealth power of oligarchs shapes and constrains
Indonesia’s democracy far more than democracy constraints the power of wealth.169”
NGOs and other civil society groups
Though Winters, Hediz and Robinson believe that the oligarchs have been the most
powerful and dominating force in Indonesia’s democratization, it has faced oppositions from
other scholars with the likes of Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall, who contend that civil
society groups and non-governmental organizations have been a great catalyst for
democratization.170 Since the very early stages of democratization – during the May Riots
that pressured Suharto to resign from power – they have been a productive force for
democracy. Their presence in the political arena confronted the government with another
force with the power to reshape the political landscape. Mietzner and Aspinall said that,
“Without this energetic civil society activism, many of the key political reforms of the post-
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1998 period probably would not have materialized or would have been much weaker.171”
Their presence can be felt in the rising number of organizations, forms of protests and
communication networks dealing with issues of human rights, environmental activism, labor,
and peasantry.172
The dynamics between civil society and oligarchs are interesting because as civil
society groups become more active, the influence of the oligarchs would weaken.173 They,
too, act as watchdogs to ensure that good governance and strong rule of law is upheld in the
government; consequently ensuring that corruption in the government is reduced.
Unfortunately, as of now, civil society groups still lack the necessary influence to make their
voices heard in the parliament and affect the legislative processes.174 Other organizations
such as the United Nations and state-affiliated organizations have helped with capacity
building and combined efforts to reduce corruption in Indonesia and increase the likelihood
of public service delivery.175 Aspinall noted that, “that these struggles [between the oligarchs
and civil society] are complex, and take place in contradictory and fragmented ways,
involving ever-shifting political coalitions and conflicts, reflects the complexity of
Indonesian democracy and the kaleidoscopic patterns of social interest that underpin it.176”
Media
The rise of civil society groups has also been aided by the growing role of the media
in Indonesia’s democratization process. By and large the media has been free and fair, and a
series of landmark Constitutional Court decisions since 2006 and the striking down of
171
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passages in the Criminal Code that had allowed for punishment for slander against the
government have helped to enhance the protection of media freedom.177 With the growing
role of media that is free to criticize the government, it acts as a strong counterpoint against
corrupt government officials. They stand as guards and reduce the socio-political incentives
for corruption. The role of the media is also crucially important in understanding the level of
corruption incidences in the country. Prior to May 1998, the media has been largely
controlled by the government and was not allowed to criticize it in any way. Thus, it was not
able to expose any KKN-related cases openly in the media. When comparing the changes in
the level of corruption that with more transparency, it is easier to expose more corruption
cases now, and therefore it could seem as if corruption incidences have gone up even when it
has not.178
Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi (KPK)
The creation of the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) under Megawati’s
presidency in 2001 was undoubtedly a milestone in an effort to eradicate corruption in
Indonesia.179 Its aggressiveness and efficiency have been known to deliver a number of high
profile cases, including governors, general election commissioners, ministers and even its
own members.180 However, given its small budget and number of employees, it has only been
able to tackle between 12-30% of all corruption cases.181 Out of these numbers, most of the
cases were related to the issue of corruption at the national level and less so at the district
level, which are delegated to prosecutorial offices across the country. Their power will also
continue to be limited so long as the judiciary remains weak as many cases of power abuses

177

Michael Buehler, “Indonesia,” Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads (2010): 6-7.
Günther Schulze (professor at the University of Freiburg in Freiburg, Germany) in discussion with the author,
November 4, 2014
179
Amy Freedman and Robert Tiburzi, "Progress and Caution: Indonesia's Democracy." Asian Affairs: An
American Review, 39: 136-138.
180
Michael Buehler, “Indonesia,” Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads (2010): 15.
181
Ibid.
178

Kirana 37

continue to go unpunished.182 Additionally, the role of strong oligarchs also undermines the
power of the judiciary to fully act independently and in some cases, influential figures have
found ways to gain immunity from legal punishments.183 Nonetheless, the KPK has been
successful in bringing to light and charging many corrupt politicians and business figures,
which would have been impossible under the Suharto regime. Its work has sent a loud and
clear message of anti-corruption and its presence and its growing importance would further
deter politicians or other government officials from engaging in corrupt activities.
Culture and society
Analyzing different actors’ socio-political incentives, it is hard to omit the role of
culture in the equation. Indeed, social norms are an important determinant of corruption, but
it is a hard element to capture.184 This issue was investigated by Eric Chang and Yun-Han
Chu in their paper, “Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?” They
defined Asian corruption exceptionalism as, “cultural subjectivity in terms of how people
perceive corruption,” and interestingly, found that there is no such exceptionalism.185 Both
Dr. Christian von Lübke and Dr Krisztina Kis-Katos concurred with the statement and noted
that it is misleading to think that culture and corruption are linked because corruption could
happen anywhere. To classify a country as having a corrupt culture in its nature, it presumes
that it is an inherent problem that cannot be changed. Perhaps in some areas, corruption is
much more expected, or there is a higher reliance on family, but as soon as the state is stable
enough to take over some of those benefits that come from their extended family, these
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corruption tendencies would disappear.186 Dr. von Lübke added that what matters far more
than the culture argument is the difference in system of governance and quality of institutions
across countries.187
Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain further noted that changing socio-political culture takes time
and we need to be more realistic when we assess the changes in the level and spread of
corruption.188 Jokowi’s victory in the recent presidential election is a positive step towards a
more corrupt-free political system, though it is not going to change everything all at once.
Since culture is a factor of political systems and institutions, overtime, as political systems
and institutions reform themselves to be more democratic and circumstances change, so too
would the culture be less accepting of corrupt behaviors.189
Relationship between decentralization and corruption
Analyzing all of these different factors, we come to the conclusion that while
decentralization was an important factor in Indonesia’s democratization process; it has also
opened up new incentives for different actors to engage in corrupt activities. Given the
difficulty in reaching a solid, objective and quantifiable number in measuring corruption, one
could only rely on qualitative assessment and anecdotes that may not fully reflect the changes
in corruption incidences in Indonesia. While the nominal level of corruption remains
debatable, one echoing statement regarding decentralization and corruption does agree that
political decentralization has led to the decentralization of corruption and the rise in petty
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corruption.190 This is made possible through the disappearance of the ‘one-stop’ bribe system
during the New Order and the rise of more fragmented bribe collection system.191 Due to the
rise in numbers of bribe takers, perhaps corruption now plays a more important role more
than ever in affecting economic efficiency and development in Indonesia.192 Nevertheless,
even though decentralization came with its disadvantages, it is not an argument against
democratization. On the contrary, it suggests the imperative need to focus on improving good
governance at the district level and building credible institutions that would strengthen the
checks and balances mechanism.193
Implications on Indonesia’s Socio-Development Aspect
The need to study changes in corruption levels and socio-political incentives in postSuharto Indonesia is because it is linked to the socio-economic development and welfare of
the people. There is nothing benevolent about corruption as it is a form of misallocated
resources that are not going towards the betterment of the people’s welfare. Studies have also
shown that corruption is one of the main causes of the low growth rates of developing
countries.194 Perhaps, this has to do with the change in the nature of corruption, as the
coordination amongst Suharto’s close alliances minimized transaction and political cost, but
with the end of those alliances, came more tiers of bureaucracy and administrative cost that
hampered investment and economic productivity.195

190

Ari Kuncoro, “Bribery and Time Wasted in Indonesia: A test of the Efficient Grease Hypothesis,” Economics
and Finance in Indonesia Vol.52 No.1 (2006): 34-35.
191
Ibid.
192
Ibid.
193
Günther Schulze (professor at the University of Freiburg in Freiburg, Germany) in discussion with the author,
November 4, 2014
194
Benjamin Olken, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonseia,” Journal of
Political Economy Vol.115 No.2 (2007): 201. http://www.povertyactionlab.org/publication/monitoringcorruption-evidence-field-experiment-indonesia
195
Akhmad Rizal Shidiq, “Decentralization and Rent-Seeking in Indonesia,” Ekonomi dan Keuangan Vol.51
No.2 (2003): 177.
Kirana 40

Looking at the socio-economic development variables, Indonesia’s performance in
the decade between 1998 and 2008 was reasonably good relative to other emerging market
democracies around the world, especially given that it had just been severely hit by the Asian
Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.196 It maintained a 4.8% GDP growth rate – comparable to its
East Asian counterparts – and a rising annual population growth rate and adult literacy
rate.197 But if the people do not think these variables are improving fast enough or if it fails to
deliver actual change in the local districts, the people’s trust in democracy will start to
wane.198
Nonetheless, it is rather ironic that one of the two main reasons for decentralization
was to see improvements in socio-economic developments, yet due to poor implementation;
decentralization has not shown to be the better alternative in this manner. In line with the
findings of the study by Dr. Krisztina Kis-Katos and Dr. Günther Schulze about
administrative overspending in the local districts, Dr. Alexander Freire, professor of
sociology of education at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, also noted that upon closer
investigation at the regional budget distribution, it is apparent that health and education
received very little attention.199 This result goes to show that hasty decentralization could
bring in more disadvantages and make the effectiveness of public service delivery more
ambiguous.200
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Difficulties in measuring corruption
Despite the creation of independent institutions designed to monitor and track the
levels of corruption, it is still an elusive factor that is hard to measure and observe. By nature,
corruption is hard to grasp conceptually and even more difficult to measure empirically.201
Most of the measurements available today look at perceptions of corruption, which is
something that could be affected by various other uncontrollable factors. Corruption is
multidimensional, yet current measurements to understand corruption levels are typically
limited to one specific activity. Beyond that, it is sometimes also hard to agree on one
definition of corruption, and the legality of certain acts could also be questionable at times.202
Corruption is also a very context specific issue, and theories about corruption cannot
necessarily be applied universally.203 Yet, even though measuring corruption is challenging,
especially because these activities are done in secret and illegally, it is still a worthwhile
cause to assess the magnitude and consequences of it and come up with the appropriate
responses.

Other Factors Affecting the Government’s Ability to Deliver on Public Services
Finally, while corruption plays an important part in the government’s ability to deliver
public services, there are also other factors besides corruption that also come into play. First
of all, there is the scale of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 that hampered the ability
of Indonesia to recover and show high growth as the country faced more uncertainty, higher
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reliable wealth defense and lower rates of investment.204 The financial crisis also led to a
change in political system, and adjusting to a new political structure requires time.
In addition, historical and legacies of previous regimes should also be taken into
consideration because they play a role in shaping the political contours of Indonesia.
Corruption and collusion were also serious problems during Dutch colonial times, and these
issues were exacerbated during Suharto’s presidency. Jeffrey Winters noted a very important
point saying that, “In fact, it is misguided to suggest that democracy is to blame for slower
growth rates since the inception of Reformasi. If anything, Indonesia’s democracy works
remarkably well considering the political damage inflicted on the body politic for a decade by
Sukarno and then for three decades by Suharto.205” The fall of Suharto also led to the slowing
down of the economy because his business partners had to pull all of their investment out,
which led to a domestic investment void in the economy.206

Implications for Reforms
While the nominal change in corruption levels in Indonesia between the New Order
and the Reformasi era is still widely debated, there is a clear need to reform several aspects of
the government, and this paper seeks to bring to light some policy implications. Firstly, there
is a need to increase the level of political competitiveness at the local level. Dr. Krisztina KisKatos and Dr. Günther Schulze commented that, “More transparency of, and higher
competition in the political process as well as lower barriers to entry in the political market
may be important elements for improving the formal accountability mechanism.207” Higher
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budget transparency and more competitive press would also help in reducing misallocation of
resources by the local governments.
In addition, another crucial reform is needed in the area of low pay in the Indonesian
bureaucracy. Ambassador Linggawaty Hakim poignantly points out that one of the root
causes for corruption that gives people incentives to do so is the inadequate salary system that
affects their own welfare. As long as the state is unable to give them adequate welfare,
corruption will continue to spread because civil servants, given the opportunity, would seize
it for their own good.208 Another reason for the increase in wages is also to make the public
sector more competitive, because the state currently loses many great talents to the private
sector, who is able to provide them with a higher salary. By keeping the salary low, the
government can only be filled by public servants who are unable to compete in the private
sector.209 Following this, there is also the need to also have a budget reform to use the state
expenses more efficiently. There is a misconception that state expenses should be cut to be
more efficient, but efficiency requires money.210 Currently, the central government is on the
right track as they are looking to reduce fuel subsidies to make room in their national budget
for other development issues. Even though this is a painful thing for a country to have to go
through in the short run, it will hopefully bear fruit in the future.211
Moreover, to curb the problem of corruption at the local level, the central government
should strengthen its regulations and create more monitoring systems. If possible, it should
also increase public party financing, so that parties are less incentivized to look for private
donors – an area which is often susceptible to nepotism and bribery.212 Bureaucratic reforms
should also include minimizing interactions with bureaucrats and creating simpler and fewer
208

Linggawaty Hakim (Indonesian ambassador to Switzerland in Bern, Switzerland) in discussion with the
author, November 5, 2014
209
Ibid.
210
Alexander Freire (professor at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, Switzerland) in discussion with the author,
October 22, 2014
211
Ibid.
212
Michael Buehler, “Indonesia,” Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads (2010): 18-19.
Kirana 44

regulations. The central government should also look into enhancing the role of civil society
groups in the country so that they could act as an anchor to the power of the oligarchs. So
long as the social order of the previous regime remains in place, cries of reforms from
progressive liberals in the country will continue to be stifled.213
Finally, one of the most important, if not the most important factor, is the need to
reform the judicial system. Amongst many, it needs to repeal legal impediments to freedom
of expression, reinstall oversight powers of the Judicial Commission to combat judicial
corruption and reduce subnational executive interference and strengthen law enforcements in
the country.214
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III. CONCLUSION
Conclusion
“Power tends to corrupt,” and with the empowerment of 473s local bureaucrats and
more local parliament members, came more opportunities for these government officials to
abuse their power. By looking at the changes in incentive structure, this paper has sought to
measure changes in corruption from more of a qualitative perspective and succinctly analyze
how changes in political institutions and legal structure make it more likely for actors to act
in one way or another. While Indonesia has been classified as an electoral democracy and has
passed a key litmus test on democratic consolidation215, it still has a long way to go in terms
of achieving the title of a liberal democracy. We have to look past just the institutions
created, but understand that states do not operate on a blank state, but stand on contours that
have been slowly growing. In the words of Dr. Christian von Lübke, “Roads are important,
but what it stands on, is more important.216”
Democratization and decentralization in Indonesia did not lead to disintegration – as
was feared by leaders at the time – yet, the quality of local government and public service
delivery has not necessarily improved across the archipelago.217 Despite the creation of
democratic institutions making it easier to reduce corruption, decentralization has led to more
corruption at the local level and it has not been conducive to higher socio-economic
development. Decentralization may not necessarily yield the results that progressive liberals
had initially expected, but given the context that it was operating in, it has started to build
more credible political institutions to reduce corruption and ensure that no one interest is
powerful enough to shape the course of the country’s politics and economic trajectory. The
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result of the study is not an argument against democracy; rather, it is an argument in favor of
maximizing democracy’s potential to deliver higher socio-economic development by
focusing on the implementation at the local level.218
To do this, Indonesia needs a stronger civil society and press, and a more open and
competitive political system at the local level. Rome was not built in a weak, and the creation
of inclusive institutions that will lead to reduction in corruption levels should continue to be
on Indonesia’s top agenda in the coming years. Given the multidimensional issue of
corruption, it is not the sole responsibility of the Corruption Eradication Committee to solve
the problem of corruption, but it calls upon the government, civil society groups and the
people to solve the issue comprehensively. While the results of decentralization have not
done justice to its goal of improving public service delivery in Indonesia; with the
improvements of accountability, transparency and checks and balances mechanism at the
local level, the dream of achieving higher socio-economic development will become a reality.
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